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JUN 28 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, National Security Council

SUBJECT:

Atomic Energy Intelligence

REFERENCE:

(a) Memorandum from Executive Secretary, NSC, to DCI dated 8 February 1950

(b) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Atomic Energy Intelligence dated 9 June 1950, transmitted to Executive Secretary, NSC, 13 June 1950

- 1. The Intelligence Advisory Committee has considered the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Atomic Energy Intelligence (Reference (b)). It concurs in general with the comments, conclusions, and recommendations.
- 2. Specific comments of the Intelligence Advisory Committee on the recommendations in the Report, together with an indication of action which can be taken immediately or in the near future, are set forth below. This matter will be kept under continuous study and will be carried on the agenda of the Intelligence Agencies.

#### RECOMMENDATION 1:

"That an overriding priority be assigned to the collection of atomic energy information."

## Intelligence Advisory Committee Comment:

An "overriding" priority is not considered justified or practicable. It is agreed, however, that collection of atomic energy information should have as high a general priority in all collection agencies asany other targets.

#### Immediate action:

Each collection agency will determine where extraneous duties are assigned high priority and interfere with the collection of atomic energy information. Such duties will then be eliminated or assigned a lower priority, as appropriate.

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## Immediate Action:

Arrangements will be made by Central Intelligence Agency to assign additional technically qualified personnel from the intelligence producing agencies to \_\_\_\_\_ and such other places as appear to be indicated.

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Steps will be taken by the appropriate agencies to minimize the delay in transmission of raw intelligence information from the field to the users in Washington.

### Further Action:

	It is recognized that coordination of intelligence activities
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	ton, under the leadership of Central Intelligence Agency, to clari-
25X1A6A [	fy the responsibilities of the Director of Intelligence, 25X6C
	and other intelligence authorities All agencies in 25X1A6A
	will be directed to support the Director fully in his co-
	ordinating activities.
	It is expected that the forthcoming assignment of scientific.
F	attaches to various posts by the Department of State and additional
25X1D	Liaison Officers to certain appropriate collection
	activities will result in improved overt collection of scientific
	information.

## RECOMMENDATION 5:

"That AFSA activities be augmented immediately as has been repeatedly recommended including emphasis on obtaining all possible scientific and technical assistance in a high priority attempt to solve current and pressing problems."

### Immediate Action:

Central Intelligence Agency and the other agencies will assign, within the limits of available appropriations, professional and clerical personnel for temporary duty with AFSA.

#### Further Action:

It is understood that certain proposals to increase substantially AFSA appropriations and personnel ceilings areunder current consideration in the JCT. Further proposals will be made in USCIB.

#### RECOMMENDATION 6:

"That the control and administration of covert and overt operations abroad be clearly defined."

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## Immediate Action:

Relationships between State Department and OSO/CIA representatives have been clarified in a recent agreement between State and Central Intelligence Agency.

## Further Action:

Similar clarification is needed in occupied areas.

## RECOMMENDATION 7:

"That direct and continuous consultation be directed between technical analysts and groups directly concerned with collection operations."

## Immediate Action:

Steps are being taken in Central Intelligence Agency to effect such direct and continuous consultation.

## RECOMMENDATION 8:

"That the pertinent National Security Council Intelligence Directives be consolidated and amended to effect active coordination of intelligence activities concerned with the national security, to simplify the present interlocking committee structure, and to eliminate the necessity for the unanimous consent procedure as currently practiced."

# Intelligence Advisory Committee Comment:

In general, it is believed that the amendment of existing directives would not contribute materially to the solution of the problems raised in this paper. In certain cases and areas, steps will have to be taken, under the leadership of Central Intelligence Agency, to insure compliance with existing directives.

Where intelligence responsibilities are widely spread within the Government, a rather elaborate committee structure is considered inevitable and even desirable. The Intelligence Advisory Committee does not agree that the "unanimous consent procedure as currently practiced" should be eliminated, because provision has been made in every case for resolution of disagreements by higher authority. It is recognized, however, that a reluctance to resort to higher authority has to some extent frustrated clear-cut action and has to be guarded against.

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central
Intelligence

cc: IAD Members